



**The ascendancy and fall Italian  
domination in southern Red Sea Arabian  
During The first half of the twentieth  
century A.D**

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**Abstract:**

This paper reviews several theories underlying the ascendancy and fall Italian domination in southern Red Sea during the first half of the twentieth century, by analyzing original sources.

Since 1901 There was an agreement and coordination between Italy and England and France on the division of spheres of influence in the region, Italian interests in that district have been emphasized to secure the political and economic influence of Italy in the Yemen and Eritrea. On 1929 a change occurred in Italy's policy when it separated its relations with Yemen and establishing a relationship of friendship and alliance with Ibn Saud, but he to grant the British companies' concessions in the western coastal region to use the British as a barrier against the augmented Italian threat in the southern part of the Red Sea. In August 1940, when Italy declared war on Britain succeeded British forces eliminated Italian Empire in East Africa, and the Saudi-Italian relations were frozen under British pressure.

The analysis hopes to provide findings for future understanding to explore the goals and methods of imperialist countries to control the strategic regions the basin Red Sea as The Italian embraced 's principle that the " keys to the Mediterranean are found in the Red Sea", the Role Britain in exclusion of Italy from the territories of western and southern Arabia, the Red Sea to protect British interests, and the role Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront the imperialist for insurance the road to two Holy Mosques.

**keywords:**

**Red Sea - Italian domination – British - Saudi Arabia.**

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The importance of this study is due to the importance of the security of the Red Sea region in insurance the road to Two Holy Mosques whereas Hajj is of paramount importance to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for religious, political, and economic reasons.

After the opening of the Suez Canal the Italian interest in the Red Sea region increased, and after failed to gain territory she desired in Tunisia, she looked for other areas of colonial expansion in Africa Acting with the encouragement of the British. The Italian foreign secretary Mancini<sup>1</sup> embraced 's principle that the keys to the Mediterranean are found in the Red Sea as a political strategy to become a stronger European state, especially in the context of Italy's alliance with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire. He sought to colonial politics were complementary to continental ones which limit itself to commercial interests, rather than territorial expansion<sup>2</sup> so he believed the territory of Assab purchased by the Italian company Rubattino in 1869 was Italian territory rather than foreign territory under Italian sovereignty, and this status merited the imposition of Italian law, rather than consular law<sup>3</sup>.

with the death of Emperor Yohannis of Ethiopia, Italy gained an opportunity to expand her colony. When Menelik of Shoa fought his political rivals for the Ethiopian throne, he took arms and ammunition from the Italians, in return, Menelik recognized Italy's. Italian expansion inland was stopped, sharply and dramatically after battle of Aduwa in March, 1896. the result confined Italy to the coastal areas until after World War I, this battle revealed the danger to would-be colonial powers from modern arms in native hands. These events established Italian interests in the region. they later joined the British in protesting the arms market at Djibouti<sup>4</sup>.

Observations of the French Ambassador contain no allusion to the export of arms from Djibouti to the opposite Arabian Coast for re-exportation to that of Africa. As this is the manner in which the traffic is chiefly conducted, it will doubtless be necessary again to approach the French Government on the subject. Before doing so, however, I have thought it advisable to consult the Italian Government<sup>5</sup>. In November 1901 the memorandum by Consul-General Hayes Seidler, on the subject of the trade in arms at Djibouti and danger arising therefrom to possessions Italy in East Africa, was used as content for proposals for concerted action by the Governments of Italian and French and Britain

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Government with a view to the suppression of the traffic arms. On the 27 August 1901 Sir Monson was instructed to call the attention of the French Government to the inconvenience caused to the British and Italian Governments by the unrestricted arms trade in arms at Djibouti <sup>6</sup>.

There was an agreement and coordination between Italy and England and France on the division of spheres of influence in the region. In February 1911 the British government confirmed its willingness to cooperate to some degree with Turkey to prevent the traffic in arms along the Yemeni coast, either in virtue of existing agreements between Italy, England and France, or by the exercise of supervision by means of a warships, But it will not in any way abdicate the matter of principle, which affects prestige, and should be fully preserved, in order to preserve the common interests and reciprocal agreements concerning the Red Sea between Italy and England, and in order to prevent certain causes and opportunities of abuse, which would in turn lead to grave incidents<sup>7</sup>. On 25 May 1911 Came in enclosed draft of a protocol between Italy, England and France for the suppression of the contraband trade in arms ammunition in the Ottoman territorial waters in the Red Sea and the neighboring zone : The Marchese imperial well-known agents Italian, English and French in the Red Sea are authorized in the same way as the commanders of warships to follow up the matter of the flag and if necessary to inspect the cargo either by their desire or at the request of the commanders of the Turkish warships, without distinction between the flags of the three powerful officials<sup>8</sup>.

During the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912) Italian military activity moved to the Red Sea. The Italian Navy besieged the ports of the Red Sea, such as the siege of the port of Hodeida on January 25, 1912, and the detention of the Italian destroyer Articles, the steamer Tuna on January 26, 1912, and the steamer Woodcock, and the Italian corvette Calabria on 2 February 1912 and again detained by the Italian corvette Elba on 27 March 1912<sup>9</sup>. During the Turkish-Italian war of 1911-1912, Italy entered into relations to The Idrisi and provided him with arms.

we are read In Report dated 17 January 1916 contained letter from Brigadier-General Price, Political Resident, at Aden, about Idrisi' visit at Jizan: " no Italian officers were allowed to land on his soil and Trade from Djibouti, Massawa and Asab comes in dhows via Kamaran to Meidi. It is wise to acquiesce in the return of trade by this dhow from Meidi to the three above

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mentioned foreign ports of the African coast, more especially that the Idrisi remarked that many of the Arab importers of Meidi and Jizan were Italian subjects from Massawa and Asab. This trade from the foreign parts of the African side largely increases our naval patrol's vigilance. We cannot, however, stop it without offending our French and Italian friends, who already have met the Resident's wishes by considerably cutting down the flow of kerosene oil and also by limiting the number of dhows per month. in this time Britan are closed All southern Red Sea Arabian ports to trade by exception are All goods carried from Aden, Perim, and Kamaran to Meidi and vice versa, which will be taken by Cowasjee, Dinshaw, and Brothers steamers and by no other means. Goods from Djibouti, Massawa and Assab in the French and Italian dhows respectively will be carried between those ports and Medi and none other Idrisi port. These dhows will be reported to the Port Officer in Cameroon to obtain special licenses, and any vessel in violation of this order will be stopped by the Maritime Patrol"<sup>10</sup>. This Report shows Britain control about the southern Red Sea Arabian ports in During The beginning of the twentieth century A.D.

We Read in Memorandum by the India Office at September 1916: Italy was not a party to the Anglo-Russo-French agreement regarding the Arab State, and while it is almost certain that she will object to the allotment of Mersina and Adana to France, it is possible that she will also object Article 10 (of M. Cambon's note of 9<sup>th</sup> May 1916), which is in fact directed against her. And she may yet claim a sphere of influence, short of territorial possession, in the Yemen. Italian interests in that district have been emphasized in imperialist press it means that the really important matter is to secure the political and economic influence of Italy in the Yemen, which is an indispensable complement to Erithrea<sup>11</sup>

In January 1917 Sir Frederick Arthur Herzl wrote a memorandum. Its purpose is to illustrate "why the exclusion of Italy from the territories of western and southern Arabia and the Red Sea was essential to British interests". The importance of the Arabia from its geographical position, lying along two of the main approaches to India, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf a commonplace and Emphasis on the strategical importance of Aden, in addition to being a fortress, Aden is a gateway to overland trade with Yemen, it is The Yemen on Which Italian ambition are mainly fixed<sup>12</sup>.

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The Imam of Yemen hated the Italians who besieged his coast and supported Al-Idrisi with arms and money during the war. From the preceding description of the general political conditions, it must be clear that the appearance of Italy in the Yemen would create in western and southern Arabia a Congestion which would not be limited to that region. These some of the reasons for which we have took the precaution of providing in the Anglo-French Convention that the British and French Governments agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula. For the present purpose, a sphere of influence is equivalent to territorial possessions. In addition, The Italo-Turkish War made Italy the most unpopular of the Christian power in the Islamic world. This unpopularity is enhanced by the Italian methods of colonial administration, and by national characteristics in particular by Italian treatment of the women of subject races, a point on which Muslim opinion is very sensitive<sup>13</sup>.

Towards the end of the year 1916, however the Italian Ambassador in London had made several inquiries to Britain Government about occupation of the Farsan Islands.<sup>14</sup> In 26th January 1917, J. M. Stewart, Major-General, Political Resident, Aden send copy forwarded with compliments to his Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London, about an agreement between Al-Idrisi Said and related to the Farsan Islands, mentioned in it: His minister, (Ba Sahi) declared That the Farasan Islands were belonged to Al-Idrisi before the 30th April 1915, and that, though not specifically mentioned, the Farasan became at once a part and parcel of his sea-board and within the purview of that treaty. On result of the present agreement will be the exclusion of Italian influence in the Idrisi's domains. His minister told me that the Italians were very desirous of concluding agreements with Idrisi to secure a quid pro quo of their long-established connection qui the arms trade and that even now the Italians sent him ammunitions. At the same time the Idrisi scouted the idea of dealing with any power save Great Britain, and to our government he looked for every form of assistance<sup>15</sup>. It would also seem desirable to inform the Italian government that all the islands in the Red Sea are formerly under Turkish sovereignty naturally pass to the Arab State and are covered by the protection extended to that State by the Anglo-French agreement, It might further be pointed out that Farsan Islands are in the occupation of the Idrisi,

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whose territories under British government are bound by treaty to safeguard, and that the British flag has been hoisted on them duration of the war in token of that obligation<sup>16</sup>. Italy, being one of Mussulman Powers bordering on the Red Sea cannot remain different to the question of the equilibrium of power in the Red Sea, and of the political conditions of the Arabia, which faces Eritrea. We ask, therefore, that no Power shall occupy Arabia, that commerce and commercial penetration be free. That the holy places of Islam in the Hijaz be in the Mussulman hands, and that the Farsan Islands upon the coast of Asir be occupied by the Italians<sup>17</sup>. The Occupation of the Farsan Islands by Italy would gravely prejudice the political and strategic interests of Great Britain in the Red Sea and the Arabian mainland. Italy is already in possession of the Dahlak Archipelago and port of Massawa on the coast facing the Idrisi's dominations, and if will held the Farsan group as well, it would command, at this point, Read Sea route to India; while, as regards the mainland, she would use the Farsan Islands as base for commercial and political penetration. The exclusion of the Italians from the Farasan Islands is thus an important to Britain interest, and the supplementary agreement with the Idrisi has placed the means of defending this interest in Britain hands, and will not consent to a third power acquiring territorial possession in the Arabian Peninsula, or installing in the Arabian naval bases on the east coast peninsula or on the islands of the Red Sea<sup>18</sup>.

At the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, Italy shows interest in the eastern coast of the Red Sea. It concentrated its influence in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen and supported Sharif Hussein for try to destabilize the British presence in the Red Sea, for use Yemen as a gateway to the Arabian Peninsula for economic and strategic considerations, so concluded an agreement in 1926 with Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din the Yemen governor, who was needed Italy's support in his conflict with Britain<sup>19</sup>.

By the summer of 1925, officials at the Britain Foreign Office's Eastern Department were confronted with two distinct but by now increasingly overlapping issues in the Red Sea: The Imam and Italian activity. There were three main domestic personalities in Arabia: The Imam of Sanaa, who was effectively the ruler of Yemen minus that area controlled by Britain, the Idrisi, who ruled the minor territory of the Asir, and lastly Ibn Saud, ruler of what was to become Saudi Arabia. The Britain Foreign Office, however, had already recognized the potential danger of such activity. Victor Mallet of the Eastern



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Department believed that Italian interest was stimulated by the possibility of oil in the Farsan Islands, adjacent to the Idrisi's territory. His fear was that the Idrisi might offer an oil concession in return for Italian armaments<sup>20</sup>. The problem of Italian intrigue in the Yemen was becoming more acute. The port of Hodeidah had been captured by the Imam the previous January. He was now second only to Ibn Saud in terms of power and influence in the Arabian Peninsula. The Foreign Office was beginning to understand just how important the Imam was and the growing significance of his relationship with Italy. The prospect of such an alliance was regarded again with concern by Mallett. Aware of the potential disruption to British communications and trade around Aden and Somaliland, he stated emphatically that "we do not want Italy playing at politics anywhere in Arabia, and sooner or later we shall have to tell her so."<sup>21</sup>

Competition between Britain and Italy for influence in the Red Sea gained momentum. The latter increased its supply of war material to the Imam, while Britain sought to forestall Italian encroachment in the Farsan Islands by allowing British companies, notably the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Eastern and General Syndicate, to bid for the oil concession there<sup>22</sup>. Others began to raise concerns over Italian activities in the region. In July 1926 Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to the Foreign Office, expressing his worry that Italy might gain control over the oil Concession on the Farsan Islands, adding that, if anyone were to gain control of the concessions, they should be British<sup>23</sup>. The situation was now serious enough to prompt Chamberlain to remark that "we are engaging in a covert war with Italy, she under the Imam's Flag and we under the Idrisi."<sup>24</sup>

In September 1926 the Anglo-Italian debate in the Red Sea suddenly assumed a different complexion with the signing of the Treaty of Sanaa. its roots could be traced back to Britain's failure to come to terms with the Imam at the beginning of 1926 and the obvious disillusionment of the Yemeni leader with British diplomacy<sup>25</sup>. Within a month of the Treaty being signed, Chamberlain was presented with the opportunity to discuss the matter personally with Mussolini at Leghorn in late September 1926. By then, he had already informed Dino Grandi, Italy's Parliamentary Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that a disagreement between two local chiefs was in danger of spilling over to a misunderstanding between Britain and Italy<sup>26</sup>. In light of this

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and in view of the memorandum recently presented by Tyrrell, Mussolini suggested to Chamberlain that representatives from both countries should discuss the ongoing situation in the Red Sea and Arabia<sup>27</sup>. In view of this, occupation of the Asir on one hand and the Yemen on the other could cause conflict between Britain and Italy<sup>28</sup>. Italian diplomats now appeared to be suggesting the partition of Arabia into two spheres of influence: the Hejaz and Nejd for Britain, the Yemen and Asir for Italy<sup>29</sup>.

The CID's conclusions arrived in early November 1926.<sup>30</sup> It had been agreed that Britain should exclude any European power from the Arabian shores of the Red Sea, and most importantly from the Farsan and Kamaran Islands. The importance of these Islands, in terms of Imperial communications, and the danger posed by Italian occupation under the guise of the Imam, led the CID to suggest that their defense should be undertaken by Britain itself rather than the Idrisi.<sup>31</sup>

On 11 January 1927 Clayton and Graham met Gasparini and Raffaele Guariglia<sup>32</sup> in Rome. It was quickly accepted by both parties that British interests revolved around political matters and the security of communications through the region, while Italian interests were commercial in nature and connected with the economic expansion of Eritrea<sup>33</sup>. On 15 January, news arrived that Ibn Saud and the Idrisi had signed the Treaty of Mecca, which now put the Asir under the protection and suzerainty of the Ibn Saud. This would undoubtedly shift the balance of power in the region away from the Imam, reinforcing the Idrisi's claims against him, and complicate the Imam's relations with Britain. Italian interests were likely to suffer accordingly. Although the Italian delegates in Rome lobbied Britain to refuse recognition of the treaty, the Foreign Office felt that it could not do so, when it was in amicable treaty relations with both Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, merely to satisfy the dubious claims of a third ruler, with whom Britain had poor relations<sup>34</sup>.

The Anglo-Italian discussions finally concluded on 10 February with a joint declaration affirming Britain's strategic interests regarding the Kamaran and Farsan Islands, but acknowledging Italian economic interests in the region.<sup>35</sup> they had also forced Italy to openly relinquish any political activities and accept a ceiling on its ambitions in the Red Sea.

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By the close of 1927, Italy came to realize that it had backed the wrong man in the Imam. Now, in the first months of 1928, this impression grew stronger. Not only was the Imam in danger of being eclipsed by Ibn Saud, who by now had taken control of the Asir, he was starting to come to terms with the realities of British power.<sup>36</sup>

At the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, Italy shows interest in the eastern coast of the Red Sea. It concentrated its influence in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen and supported Sharif Hussein for try to destabilize the British presence in the Red Sea, for use Yemen as a gateway to the Arabian Peninsula for economic and strategic considerations, so concluded an agreement in 1926 with Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din the Yemen governor, who was needed Italy's support in his conflict with Britain<sup>37</sup>.

By 1929, then, Italian policy in the Red Sea was essentially compliant with British desiderata. Although Italy continued to maintain a watching brief on the region, and Arabia especially, into the 1930s, it had been served notice that blatant expansionism would not be tolerated. Any attempt at a "regional" policy in the face of British dominance had been abandoned for the time being. Consequently, public and private utterances from Rome implied that, rather than competing, Italy was now willing to align itself with Britain. Unless it did so, it faced the prospect of losing whatever influence it still possessed in that region<sup>38</sup>. The Anglo-Italian discussions finally concluded with a joint declaration affirming Britain's strategic interests regarding the Kamaran and Farsan Islands, but acknowledging Italian economic interests in the region.<sup>39</sup> they had also forced Italy to openly relinquish any political activities and accept a ceiling on its ambitions in the Red Sea.

In 1933, Fuad Hamza opened negotiations with the Italians regarding concessions for oil exploration in Al-Asha, Asir and the Farsan Islands, and the king approached that in communication with the Italian group. However, he preferred British companies that had the same interest in Asir and the Farsan Islands, and during his visit to Rome in 1934 was that of an oil concession in the Farsan Islands That one of the important subjects discussed with the Italians<sup>40</sup>.

In the 1920s and 1930s, security relations between Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Italy were then important. Relations relate to the two countries'

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mutual interest in balancing the British presence in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as Italian military assistance to the burgeoning Saudi air force. Then, with the end of the colonial era, and especially the loss of the colonies and lands owned by Italy in the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, one of the most important reasons behind the strong security and diplomatic relations between Italy and Saudi Arabia during that period<sup>41</sup>.

The beginning of relations between King Abdulaziz and Italy dates back when he met a delegation of European consuls after entering Jeddah on December 24, 1925 and affirmed the rights of European countries, provided that they did not contradict Islamic law and the country's independence policy<sup>42</sup>. The Italian Consul Fares responded on behalf of the European consuls by congratulating His Majesty the King and emphasizing the respect of all European countries for the Arabs and Islamic peoples and their sanctities<sup>43</sup>.

On February 2, 1926, the Italian consul informed King Abdulaziz verbally of his government's recognition of him as King of the Hijaz and Nejd, but the official Italian government recognition was delayed four years due cause alliance between Italy and Yemen, and Italy supporting for Yemen right to control Asir. On the other hand, King Abdul Aziz feared Italy's activity in the Red Sea. Italy sought to establish an empire on the southern coasts of the Red Sea, but it faced opposition from Britain, which resorted to concluding a treaty with Imam Yahya, the ruler of Yemen, but it failed because the imam wanted an alliance with Italy to counter British influence in the country. Red Sea took advantage of the failure of Clayton, the British envoy to Yemen, and concluded an agreement of harmony and trade with Yemen in September 1926, which worried the British government and King Abdulaziz bin Saud, who was afraid of Yemen's control of Asir. Especially since Italy began supplying weapons to Yemen in the spring of 1926, which resulted in the conclusion of an agreement between King Abdulaziz and the Emir of Asir in February 1926 to address Italian ambitions in the Farasan Island<sup>44</sup>.

The death of Muhammad al-Idrisi led to a power vacuum in Jizan, which had been bound by a neighborhood treaty with Ibn Saud since 1920. This situation encouraged the Imam of Yemen to occupy Hodeidah and attack Jizan , so Hasan al-Idrisi , took control of Jizan and asked the Italians and the British for support but they refused, Al-Idrisi saw that the only way to stop the

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Yemenis' advance on his land was to seek Ibn Saud's protection, for save what was left, and signed Treaty of Mecca with Ibn Saud on 21 October 1926 which gave Ibn Saud the right to carry out foreign affairs and stop any aggression against this region, leaving al-Idrisi in control of the interior subject. As a result, Imam Yahya, with his ambitions in Jizan, inter with Saudi Arabia, long period of disagreement, which culminated in the Saudi-Yemeni war. In 1929, a change occurred in Italy's policy towards King Abdul Aziz, when it separated its relations with Imam Yahya and its alliance with Yemen and its interests in establishing a relationship of friendship and alliance with Ibn Saud, as it recognized him as the king of Najd and the Hijaz and its annexes on February 10, 1932, and signed Friendship Treaty between Italy and the Kingdom of Nejd and Hejaz and its Dependencies. The Treaty of Friendship was complemented by a trade agreement. This marked the beginning of an enduring friendship and of promising diplomatic relations between Italy and the King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud<sup>45</sup>. "With flags flying", wrote Consul Sollazzo in his report on the signing of the Treaty to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 17 February 1932, "Italy is about to take a more active part in the life of this country, which fervently aspires to improve its cultural and economic assets. Italy's unambiguous, loyal policies towards this State, combined with a spirit of deep comprehension of the history of these peoples, will be able, with time and perseverance, to achieve those results that others, who were here before us and were better equipped than us, strove in vain to achieve, being driven by selfishness and hegemonic plans alone". The diplomacy of friendship with Italy was part of Ibn Saud's wider, far-sighted plan to set up relations with the official and unofficial representatives of several countries. The intent was to strengthen the independence and autonomy of his young kingdom by restraining, as far as possible, the "hegemonic plans" of Britain, which had long been active in the strategic area of the Persian Gulf in an attempt to gain exclusive political influence in the region. At the same time, having launched a program me to modernize the country and better exploit its natural resources, Ibn Saud was trying to replace – or, at least, to complement– the invasive, self-interested presence of the British with that of other Western countries with the necessary financial means, and technical knowledge and competence<sup>46</sup>. The Treaty of Friendship, solemnly ratified in the presence of Prince Faisal in Rome on 22 April 1932, were also favor Italy's future trade penetration of Saudi Arabia. Having been informed by his son Faisal of the warm welcome he had received

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in Italy, on 30 April, King Ibn Saud expressed his deep appreciation to the Italian authorities: "I wish to maintain, at all costs, the friendship of Italy, because this friendship is very precious"<sup>47</sup>.

During the 1930s, the spreading influence of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany became obvious. Italy became a real threat in East Africa, which lay next to Ibn Saud's newly emerging state. This might have been an important reason for Ibn Saud to grant the British companies two concessions in the western coastal region of his realm. His action could have been intended to use the British as a barrier against the augmented Italian threat in the southern part of the Red Sea. ' This threat became a reality when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935-1936 to secure and control the Red Sea and its coasts<sup>48</sup>. Because of the failure of Di Pippo, the Italian government replaced its plenipotentiary minister with a new minister, Giovanni Peresco, in an attempt to restore confidence between the two countries .The Italians in Jeddah also distributed Arabic-language newspapers supporting the Italians against the British, and offered King Abdul Aziz military and economic aid, which angered Britain<sup>49</sup>. The British tried to preserve their interests in the region by confronting Italian anti-British activities<sup>50</sup>.

Therefore, the Saudi government sought arms from Italy, which welcomed military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, especially after King Abdulaziz refused to sign an agreement with Ethiopia in April 1935 due to its strained relations with Italy. This cooperation resulted in accepting the first mission of ten Saudi students for aviation training in Italy in 1936, and sending an Italian flight mission consisting of some Italian pilots accompanied by a gift consisting of three planes for training in Jeddah in 1936. <sup>51</sup>But the Italian mission did not perform its work well, and the planes were not practically fit, and the Italian teachers and engineers remained in Jeddah without work because the planes needed repair and spare parts <sup>52</sup>Meanwhile, the British refused to extend their aid to the Saudi Air Force<sup>53</sup>

During the Italo-Ethiopian War in 1935, the Italian High Command in East Africa, led by De Bono, sought to conclude arms deal with Saudi Arabia to supply it with 175 machine guns, cannons, ammunition, ten military trucks and ten tanks of the latest model, in exchange for Italy obtaining 12,000 camels from Saudi Arabia, at a value of 22 million. Italian lira, from which Saudi

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Arabia gets three million in cash, and the rest is from the value of the arms deal and to secure food for the Italian forces in Eritrea during the war<sup>54</sup>

The Italian Minister Plenipotentiary, Govany Peresco, rushed the Military Intelligence Authority to complete the deal, and Shels Odelo met with King Abdulaziz in Riyadh, and they agreed together on the need to reorganize the Saudi army according to modern systems. Mussolini to de Bono to immediately send weapons samples to Saudi Arabia Carried in complete secrecy by an Italian ship, Naples headed for Jeddah on September 22, 1935 However, the deal failed due to the outbreak of the Italian-Ethiopian war in October 1935 and the consequent pressure from the British government on the Saudi government to join the side of Britain. Italian weapons to Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that Britain landed large quantities of weapons in the port of Jeddah on October 18, 1937, the Saudi government insisted on completing the arms deal with Italy. The Saudi weapon was not available in Italy, and its provision cost the Italian treasury huge sums, which led to the failure of that deal<sup>55</sup>.

The King Abdul Aziz, tried to join the League of Nations under the threat of the Italian activity in the southern part of the Red Sea. But he finally decided not to join due to his old opinion regarding the policy of Mandate and also as a result of the repeated failures of the League of Nations to protect small countries, which became clear after Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1936-1937. The British Commissioner in Jeddah, Sir Reader Bullard, stated that King Abdulaziz's desire to join the League of Nations ceased completely in 1937.<sup>56</sup>

The British sought to establish an Arab radio station in Jeddah, similar to the Italian Radio Bari<sup>57</sup>, and the British Arab Radio began broadcasting from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in January 1938, but it was not effective in the face of the experience of the Italian radio, which exploited Arab feelings of hostility against Britain<sup>58</sup>. Therefore, Britain sought direct negotiation with the Italians in April 1938 without involving King Abdul Aziz in issues affecting his kingdom<sup>59</sup>. The Anglo-Italian agreement was signed in Rome in April 1938, which stipulated that the two parties be committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, preserving their independence, and abandoning About obtaining a privileged position of a

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political nature in any region belonging to Saudi Arabia or Yemen, and that no other country acquires a distinguished political position in either Saudi Arabia or Yemen, and that the two countries do not interfere in any conflict between them and do not interfere in their internal affairs<sup>60</sup>

As a result, both Governments, the British and the Italian, entered into negotiations, which were concluded in April 1938,<sup>61</sup> with the Agreement of Rome, which aimed at avoiding any collisions between the two powers in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. That agreement provided for an exchange of information about the movements of the armies of the two countries, and also stated that no bases would be established in the region except with the knowledge of the other side. The two sides declared that they should not threaten each other's interests or interfere in Saudi Arabian and Yemeni affairs, as both powers had already secured a strong position in the region. They would also cooperate to prevent any other power threatening their interests in those two countries<sup>62</sup>

King Abdul Aziz opposed the Rome Convention of 1938 as direct interference in the affairs of his state and placed it under joint British-Italian protection<sup>63</sup>. And the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sent an official memorandum to both the British and Italian governments on January 5, 1939, in which it clarified that it was not bound by an agreement to which it was not a party and did not agree to any clause that could limit its freedom and sovereignty<sup>64</sup>. The Italian government responded to the Saudi memorandum on March 11, 1939 that the Italian treaty The British only bind these two countries and do not impose any obligation on Saudi Arabia, and that its relationship with Saudi Arabia is regulated only by treaties and agreements concluded between Italy and Saudi Arabia<sup>65</sup>.

As a result of the Italian-British agreement, Italy obtained a status equal to that of Britain in the Red Sea<sup>66</sup> And that agreement failed to achieve Britain's goals in reducing Italian influence, as the Saudi request continued to obtain arms from Italy to confront the rebels and address foreign problems, especially after Britain stopped supplying arms to Saudi Arabia since 1929 due to the inability of King Abdulaziz to pay the price of the weapons he obtained. From Britain, as Britain was afraid of the increase in the power of Saudi Arabia in a way that threatens British interests in the Persian Gulf and the south of the



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peninsula<sup>67</sup> Saudi Arabia's attempt to obtain arms from France also failed due to King Abdul Aziz's support for the Syrian revolution against France<sup>68</sup>

On 5 January 1939, the Saudi Government, after an intensive study of that agreement, sent a memorandum to the British and Italian Governments, declaring that Saudi Arabia would not be committed to any agreement, and that the Saudi Government was not party to. Therefore, the Saudi Government would not agree to any condition that would restrict its independence and freedom with respect to the Italian-British agreement or any other agreement. Furthermore, the Saudi Government insisted that its relations with them were based on international law and also on its treaties with each of them as one sovereign state with another.<sup>69</sup> As a result, Britain and Italy, in March 1939, separately replied that the agreement only concerned the obligations of Britain and Italy and did not impose any commitment on Saudi Arabia. Also, each of them acknowledged that its relations with Saudi Arabia were in accordance with international law and according to its treaty with Saudi Arabia.<sup>70</sup>

However, King Abdulaziz's attitude toward the colonial powers, mainly Britain, France and Italy and their interests in the Middle East which might threaten his political independence, and his hatred of the Mandate policy, seem to have been the main reason underpinning his desire to develop wide international relations with those international powers which had no colonial interests in the Arab World. The reality is that the security of region the Red Sea was and still is closely linked to the security of the Two Holy Mosques, and the instability of that region was necessarily constituted a danger to the security of the Two Holy Mosques. So Saudi diplomatic during 1930s witnessed various initiatives toward the United States of America, the Soviet Union and Germany. These were put into effect through several official visits conducted by the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal and also through commercial agreements and the granting of oil concessions<sup>71</sup>.

On 1 September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland which led to the outbreak of the Second World War. The war brought with it new challenges to Saudi diplomatic. During the difficult days of 1940, with the resulting victories of Germany against the Allies, which led to the fall of France and Italy's military alliance with Germany, some of King Abdulaziz's advisors were content that the Axis power would win, but he did not share their view; he looked forward

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to the ultimate victory of the Allies, and based his actions on this belief and hope. Despite his personal views in favor of the Allies, and also his strong belief that Britain would not be defeated, the King recognized that neutrality was the best policy to protect the internal affairs of his state from interference by either side, or from any attack by the victor at the end of the war. Especially to secure the pilgrims who come annually to the Holy House of God from all over the world, therefore King Abdulaziz officially declared his strict neutrality and maintained it in order to avoid bringing his country under the direct influence of either side, and resisted all attempts by both sides to involve him<sup>72</sup>.

In August 1940, Italy declared war on Britain and succeeded in expelling the British forces from Somalia. However, the British forces managed to restore Somalia, occupy Ethiopia, and restore Haile Selassie to the throne on April 6, 1941. The Italian Empire in East Africa was eliminated.<sup>73</sup>

In spite of Saudi Arabia declared its neutrality, but the conflict soon began to cause growing difficulties for king Abdul-Aziz. Soon after Rashid Ali al-Gaylani's nationalist revolt in Iraq (openly supported by the Italians) and the spreading of the war fronts, the British authorities began to pressure the Saudi authorities into breaking their relations with Italy for security reasons, requiring the immediate closure of Italian diplomatic offices in Jeddah. Thus, after ensuring that the Legation of Turkey would take care of Italian interests in Saudi Arabia, on the morning of 8 February, the Italian diplomat, Luigi Sillitti (who had taken over from Giovanni Persico four years earlier) left Jeddah, heading for Riyadh to meet King Ibn Saud who wanted to greet him personally. The meeting took place on 15 February in the presence of the Crown Prince and the influential politician, Yussuf Yassin. Recalling the decades of friendship, King Ibn Saud told Sillitti that the pleasure of meeting the representative of the Italian government was not cancelled by the reasons and circumstances related to the constant pressure of the British, which he was not able to resist. In the meantime, on 19 February 1942, the Italian foreign minister wired his ambassador in Ankara, asking him to thank the Turkish government for agreeing to take care of Italy's interests in Saudi Arabia, stressing that "the diplomatic relations between Italy and Saudi Arabia should be seen as being interrupted rather than broken"<sup>74</sup>.

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The British pressured Saudi Arabia to sever relations between it and Italy. Indeed, on December 31, 1941, the Minister of Finance of the Saudi government informed the Italian Minister Plenipotentiary in Jeddah that the Italian Commission no longer had a presence in Jeddah. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned the Turkish Commission to take care of Italian interests. The Italian Foreign Minister expressed his regret and denounced the position of Britain, which used its influence to force an independent, neutral country to sever its relations with a friendly country. On February 2, 1942, the Italian Minister Plenipotentiary to the Saudi Minister of Finance expressed his regret over the decision taken by the Saudi government to close the Italian Legation based on British pressure, and said that the Italian government was more regrettable, given the firm and steady friendship between Italy and Saudi Arabia, and this made Italy consider the closure of the Italian Royal Commission in Jeddah as a temporary measure caused by special circumstances of a temporary nature<sup>75</sup>

On February 5, 1942, Siletti, the Italian Minister Plenipotentiary, met in Jeddah with Khalid Al-Qarqani, the special advisor to King Abdulaziz, and told him that he had received a direct authorization from the King to tell him that this situation had occurred only because of British pressures that could not be confronted as a result of the war, and that King Abdulaziz would like you to explain and convince position of the Italian government<sup>76</sup>.

Thus, after ensuring that the Legation of Turkey would take care of Italian interests in Saudi Arabia, on the morning of 8 February, the Italian diplomat, Luigi Sillitti (who had taken over from Giovanni Persico four years earlier) left Jeddah, heading for Riyadh to meet King Ibn Saud who wanted to greet him personally. On February 15, 1942, King Abdul Aziz received Siliti in presence of the Crown Prince and the influential politician, Yussuf Yassin, Recalling the decades of friendship, King Ibn Saud told Sillitti that the pleasure of meeting the representative of the Italian government was not cancelled by the reasons and circumstances related to the constant pressure of the British, which he was not able to resist and expressed to him his hope that the officials in Rome would understand his difficult position due to the constant pressure and insistence on the part of Britain, which could not be confronted, given the special situation that existed in his country during the war<sup>77</sup>.

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on 19 February 1942, the Italian foreign minister wired his ambassador in Ankara, asking him to thank the Turkish government for agreeing to take care of Italy's interests in Saudi Arabia, stressing that "the diplomatic relations between Italy and Saudi Arabia should be seen as being interrupted rather than broken". On the other hand, the Italian Foreign Minister wrote a letter to the Minister Plenipotentiary in Jeddah on February 19, 1942, in which he said, "For every good purpose, we affirm that diplomatic relations between Italy and Saudi Arabia are considered suspended and not severed."<sup>78</sup>. Thus, the Saudi-Italian relations were frozen under British pressure, against the will of the two countries.

On 4 November 1947, at the royal palace of Jeddah, the new diplomat representing the newly-born Italian Republic, Filippo Zappi, presented his credentials to Crown Prince Saud. Remembering the last, sad encounter with Sillitti on the eve of his forced departure, the latter warmly expressed his personal appreciation for the re-opening of the Italian Legation and relations between the two countries following the five-year interruption<sup>79</sup>.

Many things had changed in Riyadh since the last meeting. The intrusive British experience was now declining: its place was being taken by the ever-growing American economic influence linked to the exploitation of oil fields, which had been discovered within the area of the concession given to Standard Oil of California (Socal) in 1938. Socal merged with Texaco, forming the Californian Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc) whose name changed to the current Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in 1944. In 1948, Aramco came to include Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exon-Esso) and Standard Oil of New York (Socony-Mobil), with a view to completing and consolidating the American multinationals' presence in the Gulf area, replacing the declining British imperialism. The new scenario was immediately clear to the Italian diplomat who, in one of his first reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 5 January 1948, wrote: "With the exception of a few works for which Egypt's cooperation has been requested, all the other works have been assigned to the Americans and are guaranteed by the share on the income that Aramco has to pay on a yearly basis. The Government does not seem to worry, because they believe that, unlike other Western powers, the United States has no territorial ambitions in the Near East"<sup>80</sup>.

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on 31 January 1948, Filippo Zappi arrived at Riyadh and was immediately received in audience at the Royal Palace by Ibn Saud, who welcomed him with great warmth. In his report to the Ministry dated 11 February 1948, Zappi wrote: "I was pleasantly impressed and deeply touched by the many attentions and great kindness shown by the king. These are partly due to the wish to consolidate the friendship with Italy and partly to the wish to forget that distant 1942!". Back in Jeddah, Zappi carried on work to raise favor for the Italian Aramco workers' claims as well as to promote the presence of Italian companies in the country. He returned to Italy in August 1949. His successor as head of the Italian Legation in Jeddah, Ugo Turcato, presented his credentials to King Ibn Saud on 17 November 1949 in the course of a solemn ceremony in the presence of the king who attended in order to stress the ancient ties of friendship with Italy. In responding to Turcato's salute with sincere warmth, the king wished for "greater collaboration between the two peoples, including Italy's contribution to the modernization of Saudi Arabia." The greater economic cooperation called for by the king, and which the Italian diplomats had long been striving for, was neither simple nor easy to achieve: at the time, the Saudi Arabian market was de facto monopolized by a handful of large American corporations operating in the sectors of public works, transport and services, while Italian companies – weaker and often lacking the necessary financial resources – struggled to compete. Intensifying and consolidating diplomatic relations was easier, however<sup>81</sup>.

In fact, there was a political consideration behind Ibn Saud's step to exclude states which had a colonial outlook, among them Britain, from this concession. noted that good offers, with more advantages than the American one, had been submitted to the King from Germany, Italy and Japan with a view to obtaining concessions in Saudi Arabia, but Ibn Saud agreed to the American offer because the U. S. had no political ambitions in Arabia. Moreover, the British policy of colonialism, especially in Palestine, enraged the King, due to its support for the Zionists, which was made clear by the King through many letters sent by him to the British Government. ' This might be an important reason why King Abdulaziz worked to attract the Americans to the Middle East through commercial relations. He believed that the Arabs required another strong ally as another source of support in their critical situation in Palestine. He told the Arab High Committee that the Arabs should create a

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strong link with another major foreign power before thinking of resisting Britain. To do otherwise would make resistance an unsafe venture<sup>82</sup>.

Finally, one of the main goals that made King Abdulaziz care about the Red Sea was his keen interest in protecting The Two Holy Mosques in matters that affect the two holiest cities of Islam, Makkah al Mukarramah (Makkah the dignified) and Madinah al Munawwarah (Madinah the illuminated) and he makes every possible effort to the safety of pilgrims.

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- <sup>2</sup> Zampaglione, A., (2023). to Claim a Colony: The Evolution and Impact of Italian Colonial Land Laws in Eritrea from 1884 to 1907, Columbia University, 22.
- <sup>3</sup> Nicola Camilleri, (2020). "Colonial Subjects and Others: Racism and Inequality during Italian Rule in the Horn of Africa," Northeast African Studies 20, no. 1-2: 31.
- <sup>4</sup> Baer, G.W., (1967). The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, , 1-4; James W. Fiscus A., op. cit., pp. 172-173.
- <sup>5</sup> Bidwell, R., L., The Affairs of Arabia, 1905-1906, Vol. I, Part III, p. 76.
- <sup>6</sup> IOR/L/PS/10/193, pp. 65-66.
- <sup>7</sup> IOR/L/PS/10/193, p. 119.
- <sup>8</sup> IOR/L/PS/10/193, p.20.
- <sup>9</sup> IOR/L/PS/10/285
- <sup>10</sup> IOR/L/PS/18/B229, pp. 3,4,8.
- <sup>11</sup> IOR/LPS/18/B239, p. 3.
- <sup>12</sup> IOR/L/PS/18/B274, pp. 1-2.
- <sup>13</sup> IOR/L/PS/18/B274, pp. 2-3.
- <sup>14</sup> IOR/L/PS/18/B293A, p. 1.
- <sup>15</sup> IOR/L/PS/18/B250, pp. 112-113.
- <sup>16</sup> IOR/L/PS/18/B293A, p. 2.
- <sup>17</sup> IOR/L/PS/18/B293A, p. 5.
- <sup>18</sup> IOR/L/PS/18/B293A, p. 5.
- <sup>19</sup> The Italo-Yemeni Treaty of 1926 (also known as the Treaty of San'a) was a treaty between the Kingdom of Italy and Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen. The treaty was signed in September 1926 and was described as a friendship treaty. At the time, Italy was ruled by the fascist National Fascist Party with

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Benito Mussolini as head of government. The treaty recognized Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din as King of Yemen and acknowledged his claims to Aden. The treaty was renewed on October 15, 1937, after Italy had annexed Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia).

Christian W. E., (2007). The foreign office and Anglo-Italian involvement in the Red Sea and Arabia, 1925-28, Canadian Journal of History, 22.

<sup>20</sup> PRO, E250/176/91 FO 371 10818 No 16858/25 Colonial Office to FO in response to telegram from Resident at Aden, 15 April 1925.

<sup>21</sup> PRO, E3743/176/91 FO 371 10819 No 27065/25 Colonial Office to FO 24th June 1925. Between April 9 and 14 May, it was stated that there were seven separate instances of Italian activity at Hodeidah.

<sup>22</sup> PRO, E3198/367/91 FO 371 11442 No. 55 30/4 Secret 1 May 1926. Acting Consul, Jeddah, to Foreign Office. The acting Consul stated that three airplanes and 116 cases of equipment were landed at Hodeidah by the Italian steamship Lomedano in April 1926. Britain had decided early in 1925 against supplying weapons to any side in this region due to the volatility of the situation.

<sup>23</sup> PRO, E3198/367/91 FO 371 11442 No. 55 30/4 Secret 1 May 1926. Acting Consul, Jeddah, to Foreign Office.

<sup>24</sup> PRO, E4253/710/91 FO 371 11448 No 1 Chamberlain minute 29 July 1926.

<sup>25</sup> Christian W. E., (2007). the foreign office and Anglo-Italian involvement in the Red Sea and Arabia, 1925-28, Canadian Journal of History, 22.

<sup>26</sup> PRO, E369/2660/91 FO 371 C10124/391/90 No. 1270 Chamberlain to Wingfield (Rome) 13 September 1926.

<sup>27</sup> I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani [hereafter cited as DDI], Vol IV Settima Serie, (1922-35) (Rome, 1952). Conversation between Mussolini and Chamberlain, Livorno, 30 September 1926.

<sup>28</sup> PRO, C/10581/9326/22 FO 371 11401 Chamberlain to Tyrrell, unnumbered Confidential 1 October 1926.

<sup>29</sup> H. Erlich, (1920). "Mussolini and the Middle East in the", 206.

<sup>30</sup> PRO, E6257/2660/91 FO 371 11448 Sir M. Hankey to FO No. cp. 377 (Secret) 9 November 1926.

<sup>31</sup> PRO, E/6785/2660/91 FO 371 11488 Chamberlain to Clayton, 10 December 1926.

<sup>32</sup> Raffaele Guariglia, head of Mediterranean and Colonial Section of Europe and the Levant 1926-31.

<sup>33</sup> PRO, E266/22/91 FO 371 12235 Clayton to Mr. Oliphant 14 January 1927.

<sup>34</sup> PRO, E345/22/91 FO 371 12235 Clayton to FO 15 January 1927.

<sup>35</sup> PRO, E376/22/91 FO 371 12235 No 8 Confidential Chamberlain to Clayton (Rome), 27 January 1927.

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- <sup>36</sup> PRO, E279/80/91 FO 371 13003 Sir J. Shuckburgh, Colonial Office to Mr. Oliphant, Confidential 11 January 1928.
- <sup>37</sup> The Italo-Yemeni Treaty of 1926 (also known as the Treaty of San'a) was a treaty between the Kingdom of Italy and Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen. The treaty was signed in September 1926 and was described as a friendship treaty. At the time, Italy was ruled by the fascist National Fascist Party with Benito Mussolini as head of government. The treaty recognized Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din as King of Yemen and acknowledged his claims to Aden. The treaty was renewed on October 15, 1937, after Italy had annexed Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia).
- Christian W. E., The foreign office and Anglo-Italian involvement in the Red Sea and Arabia, 1925-28, Canadian Journal of History, 22 (2007).
- <sup>38</sup> DDI No. 241 11, Guariglia to Bordonaro, Rome 8 February 1929.
- <sup>39</sup> PRO, E376/22/91 FO 371 12235 No 8 Confidential Chamberlain to Clayton (Rome), 27 January 1927.
- <sup>40</sup> IOR/L/12/2127
- <sup>41</sup> PRO, E250/176/91 FO 371 10818 No 16858/25 Colonial Office to FO in response to telegram from Resident at Aden, 15 April 1925.
- <sup>42</sup> IOR/L/PS/98/302/12;
- <sup>43</sup> Umm al-Aura Newspaper, (1926). 57, January.
- <sup>44</sup> Mohammad Zaid Al-Kahtani, (2004).17, 128.
- <sup>45</sup> Matteo Pizzigallo, (2013). 17
- <sup>46</sup> Matteo Pizzigallo, (2013). 17-18.
- <sup>47</sup> Matteo Pizzigallo, (2013). 18
- <sup>48</sup> Vassiliev, A. (1998). The History of Saudi Arabia. London, 322.
- <sup>49</sup> Rendel, George, (1957). The Sword and the olive, London, 134 – 135.
- <sup>50</sup> Rendel, George, (1957). 134; F.O. 371/20787E 2467/65, Propaganda in Eastern Countries and Foreign Activities in the near Middle East, Committee of Imperial Defence, April 30,1937.
- <sup>51</sup> Umm al-Aura Newspaper, (1936). 604, June.
- <sup>52</sup> IOR/L/PS/95/190/6
- <sup>53</sup> FO. 371/20843 E 4025 /815 / 25, F. O. Minutes, July 10 / 1937.
- <sup>54</sup> Matteo Pizzigallo, (2013). 20.
- <sup>55</sup> Italian Diplomatic Documents, G. II, 2, 118; Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito Rome, 28<sup>th</sup> September 1935.
- <sup>56</sup> Public Record Office, FO 406/77, cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 29 January 1939.



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- <sup>57</sup> Mac Donald, op. cit., p.201.
- <sup>58</sup> F.O.371/79/13. Anglo Italian Relations in Southern Arabia, ^September 29,1937.
- <sup>59</sup> Leatherdale, Leatherdale, Clive: Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1989, Frank Cass and Company Ltd, p. 297; Cf. Linabury, George., British- Saudi Arabian Relations 1902-1927, Columbia (1970).
- <sup>60</sup> Gazette Egyptian, April 1938.
- <sup>61</sup> American Archives, 890 F. 00/48, despatch from Mr. Childs at the American State Department, Near Eastern Division, on 13 May 1938; American Archives, 890 F. 00/49, despatch from Mr. Childs, at the American State Department, Near Eastern Division, on 20 May 1938
- <sup>62</sup> Public Record Office, FO 407/76, despatch by E. Perth, the British Ambassador in Rome, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 8 April 1938
- <sup>63</sup> F.O. 371/21870 E7054/880/910 Talegram From R.Bullard TO F.O.,November 25,1938; Leatherdale, (1970). 298; Documents of the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, portfolio 305, file 430/12, in Jeddah, April 16, 1938 CE, corresponding to Safar 16, 1357 AH.
- <sup>64</sup> Documents of the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portfolio 320, File 439/7, Treaties, Jeddah, January 5, 1939 CE, corresponding to Dhu al-Qi`dah 15, 1357 AH; Umm Al-Qura Newspaper,(1939) 750, 8 Rabi` Al-Awwal 1358 A.H. / April 28.
- <sup>65</sup> Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, ,(1939) 750, 8 Rabi` Al-Awwal 1358 A.H. / April 28.
- <sup>66</sup> F.O. 371/ 21908 E100 /3821/25. From Lord Perth, Rome to Sir. Oliphant, July 7,1938.
- <sup>67</sup> F.O. 371/ 17922 E1630 /76/25. From Andrew, Ryan to Colonial Office Warner, February 27,1934.
- <sup>68</sup> F.O.371/20841/E3726/244/25; Documents of the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portfolio 80, File 220/4, June 4, 1933.
- <sup>69</sup> The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 248-249; Public record Office, FO 371/24589, yearly report by Hugh S. Bird, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax dated 18 July 1940; Public Record Office, FO 406/77, despatch from Prince Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, to Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, on 5 January 1939.
- <sup>70</sup> The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 249-250; FO 406/77, despatch from Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Prince Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, on 22 March 1939.

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- <sup>71</sup> Piscatori, (1983). 34-36; Piscatori, J. (1983a). "Islamic Values and National Interests: The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia". In Islam in Foreign Policy. Edited by Adeed Dawisha. London: Cambridge, 34-36.
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- <sup>72</sup> Public Record Office, FO 371/23269, despatch from Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 24 October 1939; FO 371/23271, cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 December 1939; Public Record Office, FO 371/23272, despatch from the British Foreign Office to Alan Trott in Jeddah on 24 August 1939; Public Record Office, FO 371/24590, report issued by Halifax to the British Government dated 2 July 1940.
- <sup>73</sup> Matteo Pizzigallo, (1970). 21.
- <sup>74</sup> Matteo Pizzigallo, (1970). 21.
- <sup>75</sup> Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri Italiano, telegramma di Celetti al Ministero degli Affari Esteri n. 835/113 R, Gedda 2 febbraio 1942.
- <sup>76</sup> Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Telegramma di Celetti al Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 15 marzo 1942.
- <sup>77</sup> L'Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri italiano, incontro del Re Abdulaziz Al Saud con il Ministro Plenipotenziario italiano a Jeddah il 15 febbraio 1942.
- <sup>78</sup> Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri Italiano, Telegramma da Ciano a Celetti n. 68/55 R, Roma 19 febbraio 1942.
- <sup>79</sup> Matteo Pizzigallo, (1970). 21.
- <sup>80</sup> Matteo Pizzigallo, (1970). 21.
- <sup>81</sup> Matteo Pizzigallo, (1970). 21.
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- PRO, E250/176/91 FO 371 10818 No 16858/25 Colonial Office to FO in response to telegram from Resident at Aden, 15 April 1925.

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- PRO, E3743/176/91 FO 371 10819 No 27065/25 Colonial Office to FO 24th June 1925. Between April 9 and 14 May, it was stated that there were seven separate instances of Italian activity at Hodeidah.
- PRO, E3198/367/91 FO 371 11442 No. 55 30/4 Secret 1 May 1926. Acting Consul, Jeddah, to Foreign Office. The acting Consul stated that three airplanes and 116 cases of equipment were landed at Hodeidah by the Italian steamship Lomedano in April 1926. Britain had decided early in 1925 against supplying weapons to any side in this region due to the volatility of the situation.
- PRO, E3198/367/91 FO 371 11442 No. 55 30/4 Secret 1 May 1926. Acting Consul, Jeddah, to Foreign Office.
- PRO, E4253/710/91 FO 371 11448 No 1 Chamberlain minute 29 July 1926.
- PRO, E369/2660/91 FO 371 C10124/391/90 No. 1270 Chamberlain to Wingfield (Rome) 13 September 1926.
- Livorno, 30 September 1926.
- PRO, C/10581/9326/22 FO 371 11401 Chamberlain to Tyrrell, unnumbered Confidential 1 October 1926.
- PRO, E6257/2660/91 FO 371 11448 Sir M. Hankey to FO No. cp. 377 (Secret) 9 November 1926.
- PRO, E/6785/2660/91 FO 371 11488 Chamberlain to Clayton, 10 December 1926.
- PRO, E266/22/91 FO 371 12235 Clayton to Mr. Oliphant 14 January 1927.
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